COMMENT
MARGARET MCKEAN*

Being a political scientist and not a lawyer, I will make remarks that are
naive, uninformed, and possibly irresponsible. I would first like to speak from
a political scientist's perspective on the two papers that concern elections,,
and then I will make some general comments about constitutional rulings and
the research agenda in Japanese constitutional law.
I usually recoil against any statements that Japan is unique, special, and
different. However, in its electoral district system, Japan is in fact unique,
special, and different. Japan's multimember single-vote electoral district
system builds in intense competition within its large political parties. In Japan
the largest party happens to be the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP"). If, for some reason, the leftist opposition coalesced into one large
party, the opposition would acquire the same problem.
The vicious competition inside the LDP promotes a lavish use of money
and increases the expense of elections. Thus, because this is intra-party
competition, the system pulls candidates away from an interest in issues and
toward an interest in personal identity. Issues become unimportant because
they do not serve to distinguish between candidates who uphold the same
party platform. Instead, name recognition becomes all-important. This
situation is troubling to most political scientists who study Japan because it
makes effective, issue-based voting nearly impossible. The system forces
voters who want their votes to be effective to guess which candidates will be
near the boundary line between winning and losing,2 then select from among
those candidates the one they dislike least, and hope that in voting for that
candidate they have not wasted their vote. It is impossible for voters to gather
the information they need (about the preferences and voting strategies of
other voters in the district) to make a rational choice among candidates in
such an electoral system. It is also, therefore, impossible for candidates to
determine with any certainty how to appeal to voters in such an arrangement.
Similarly, the restrictions on campaign activities that Professor Usaki
discussed in his paper 3 have perverse and unfortunate effects on the way
campaign funds are used in Japan. Vicious electoral competition, which is
exaggerated by the uncertainties created by the multimember single-vote
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University.
1. See Hata, Malapportionment of Representation in the National Diet, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1990, at 157; Usaki, Restrictions on Political Campaigns in Japan, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1990, at 133.
2. For example, which candidates are likely to come in third or fourth in a three-member
district, or fifth or sixth in a five-member district.
3. Usaki, supra note 1.
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system, makes electoral campaigns expensive. Yet legal restrictions forbid or
carefully minimize many of the usual mechanisms for informing voters about
issues or even candidates' names. Therefore, money is used instead to buy
voter affection or obligation. The results, both quite unfortunate, are
institutionalized corruption and personality-based rather than issue-based
campaigns.
Perhaps simultaneous reform of the district system itself, which could be
combined with a reform of malapportionment, and of restrictive campaign
laws would be a good idea. A district system that allowed candidates to
compete on issues, and campaign rules that permitted candidates to shower
voters with information rather than money, would allow voters to exercise a
choice based upon issue preference.
A single-member single-vote system is favored by the LDP because it has
been calculated that the LDP would then get 80 percent of the seats. 4 That
might not be the case if the lines were drawn around the geographical base
(jiban) of sitting politicians. One problem in electoral district reform is that
any change has to be voted on by existing politicians, who might therefore be
voting themselves out of office. These politicians would almost certainly
prefer, over any new system, the system that they have not only learned to live
with but have mastered.

In order to achieve successful reform of Japan's

electoral district system, then, a change that sitting politicians can tolerate
must be devised. The LDP is now working quite seriously on precisely this
project.
A single-member single-vote system would certainly promote rational
voting and issue-based candidacies and campaigns. It would also promote
coalition among the opposition parties, because it would become sensiblealmost necessary-for them to support jointly one opposition candidate per

district and to plan joint campaigns for all of their joint candidates. However,
a single-member single-vote system built around existing jiban would not
solve the severe malapportionment between underrepresented urban districts
and overrepresented rural districts. One would need to think further to
address this issue.
Another possibility that would be easy to institute immediately is a
multimember multivote system where, for example, voters in three-member
districts receive three votes and voters in five-member districts receive five
votes. This system is not guaranteed to produce streamlined outcomes,
however; in fact, it can degenerate into a multimember single-vote system if
voters with one or two favorite candidates give those candidates an advantage
by not casting any of the remaining votes to which they are entitled for any of
the other candidates. I use precisely this strategy in my local election for
4. It has been estimated that in a shift to a "side-by-side" (small constituency plus proportional
representation) system the LDP would win 78.9% of the House of Representatives' 511 seats, and in
a shift to the pure single-seat constituency system, the LDP would sweep 89% of the seats.
Hrebenar, Rules of the Game: The Impact of the Electoral System on Political Parties, in THE JAPANESE PARTY
SYSTEM: FROM ONE-PARTY RULE TO COALITION GOVERNMENT 47 (R. Hrebenar ed. 1986).
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County Commissioners, who are elected in a multimember multivote district,
when I am anxious to help a particular candidate get into the winner's circle.
Although I have as many as five votes, I may cast only one, so that I do not
add to the votes accumulated by my favorite candidate's competitors. This
degeneration may not occur because all voters do not vote strategically; it can
also be prevented if voters must use all of their votes to cast a valid ballot.
A multimember multivote system allows voters to vote for the slate of
representatives they most prefer without worrying as much about who gets
above the line into the winner's circle and who falls below. It would eliminate
intra-party competition and thus encourage candidates to advertise their
positions on issues. Such a system would also preserve Japan's multiparty
system, which might be desirable to represent a broad spectrum of public
opinion.
One could hypothesize endlessly about new district systems. A fruitful
exercise for political scientists and constitutional specialists interested in
solving malapportionment problems would be to dream up a system that
would promote campaigning that focuses on the issues, that informs voters
rather than bribes them, that solves malapportionment problems, and finally
that would be acceptable to sitting Diet members. Perhaps that is an
impossible task, but it is certainly worth some effort.
The campaign-rule changes that seem to be obvious improvements from
an American perspective would allow the substantive exchange of information
through more radio and television time, pamphlets, direct mail, posters, doorto-door campaigning, substantive contact between candidates and voters, and
substantive discussion of issues. One postcard per voter, one poster per
telephone pole, and a couple of minutes of free air time on public television
do not permit candidates to transmit any information beyond name, picture,
and slogan. On the other hand, I see no need for more megaphone cars; in
the interest of preventing noise pollution it probably would be best to
eliminate them altogether.
Another improvement would be a longer season for electoral campaigns.
The current restricted season on campaigning causes candidates to gain
advance publicity through illicit channels, for what is officially referred to as
"noncampaigning."
In competitive elections, candidates, especially
incumbents, try to be engaged in some sort of campaigning months, or even
years, before the official season. Extending the period of legal campaigning
would increase the flow of issue-related information compared to the contentfree contact that constitutes noncampaigning, and would reduce the inherent
advantage of incumbents over challengers.
One drawback to these suggestions is that they would give to Japan
something more like the American campaigning that never ceases. American
citizens have no trouble obtaining plenty of information, but we feel
bombarded, and we know that huge resources go into bombarding us. I
would not wish the never-ending American-style campaign on anyone else.
However, some change in the restrictive campaign procedures that Professor
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Usaki describes would perhaps funnel more of the money used in political
campaigning into informing and less into procuring voter attachment
through, for example, gifts, box lunches, bus excursions, and wedding
presents. That too may never go away, however, if voters continue to expect
these things from their candidates.
I would like to turn now to the various cases and Supreme Court rulings
that the conference has covered. We have spoken in passing about whether
the Japanese Supreme Court is active or inactive. My own naive, uninformed,
irresponsible, and brutally frank impression is that the Japanese Supreme
Court is very creative at forging politically safe solutions and is willing to live
with legal contradictions that sometimes border on the nonsensical.
Professor Okudaira said 5 that the ruling in the Repeta case 6 seemed like a
bad joke to him. The Repeta ruling stated that the scope of a judge's authority
over conduct in the courtroom was large and would remain large, but that
somehow the scope of the judge's authority would no longer include the right
to forbid notetaking. In the enshrinement case, 7 the Supreme Court deflected
potential political trouble by finding no state involvement and concluding
that, because church and state remained properly separated, there was no
constitutional problem. Finally, the Supreme Court usually interprets the
social rights clauses of the Constitution, such as Articles 25 and 27, as free of
substantive content so that they remain judicially unenforceable.
In the malapportionment cases, 8 Professor Hata outlined 9 a fascinating
evolution of argument. The Supreme Court has made it clear that extreme
malapportionment is unconstitutional, but that it will not automatically
invalidate the results of elections conducted on the basis of such
unconstitutional malapportionment. The problem here is not really an
attempt by the Supreme Court to ignore the merits of the case, rather it is a
structural one; if a past election, and therefore the sitting Diet, were declared
invalid, what legislative body could pass a new arrangement into law, and how
would it design a constitutionally acceptable apportionment scheme and
conduct a valid election for a new Diet within the tight deadlines prescribed
by the Constitution? Nonetheless, many at this conference would be
interested to see the Japanese Supreme Court experiment with the
prospective invalidation of future elections as a solution that gives the Diet a
realistic deadline by which to alleviate malapportionment.
5. Okudaira, Comment, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1990, at 129.
6. 43 Minshfi 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 8, 1989) (rev'k 1222 HanreiJih6 28 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb.
12, 1987) and 1262 Hanrei Jih6 30 (Tokyo H. Ct., Dec. 25, 1987)).
7. Nakatani v.Japan, 1277 HanreiJih6 34 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,June 1, 1988) (widow of a Christian
war veteran claimed his unrequested Shinto enshrinement violated the constitutional separation of
church and state).
8. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama, 37 Minshu 1243 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov.
7, 1983) (rev k 984 Hanrei Jih6 26 (Tokyo H. Ct., Dec. 23, 1980)); Shimizu v. Osaka Election
Comm'n, 37 Minshfi 345 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 27, 1983); Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election
Comm'n, 30 Minshii 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14, 1976); Koshiyama v. Tokyo Metropolitan Election
Comni'n, 18 Minshu 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 5, 1964).
9. Hata, supra note 1.
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In the patricide cases,' 0 as I have understood them, the Supreme Court
says that differential punishment is simultaneously unconstitutional and
allowable. With respect to the political activities that Professor Usaki
outlined, IIthe Supreme Court and sometimes the Tokyo High Court separate
freedom of thought from political activity so that a ban on political activity
does not impinge upon constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought.
Similarly, prior restraint is impermissible, but prior notification is
constitutional. 12

With respect to the Self-Defense Forces (jieitai), the Supreme Court's
position has evolved toward the view that Japan has the right of self-defense.
However, on the trickier question of whether the Forces are purely for selfdefense (constitutional) or instead constitute war-making potential (literally
unconstitutional), the Supreme Court has come to the interesting conclusion
in the Hyakuri case 13 that this is not a constitutional question unless thejieitai
are so large that it is obviously unconstitutional. Who gets to decide when the
jieitai are too large remains unsettled. With Japan having, in budgetary terms,
one of the world's largest military establishments, 14 perhaps the Supreme
Court will soon have to consider whether thejieitai are constitutionally small
or unconstitutionally large.
I have outlined these inconsistencies because the conclusion that the
Japanese Supreme Court is timid and willing to countenance much
contradiction is irresistible. These problems are not unique to Japan,
however. All supreme courts, given similar politically troubled situations, will
try to avoid firm stances through semantic obfuscation and convoluted
argument. Nevertheless, there has also been some change over time, and the
papers in this conference that presented changes in rulings and similar issues
allow one to reach some interesting conclusions.
The Supreme Court is moving toward less timidity in its rulings. For
example, we saw reversals in the cases of the bathhouses 15 and the
pharmacies. 16 Here the Supreme Court finally threw out its somewhat
artificial concern with public welfare (a concern that is in fact invented) and
treated these cases as what they always were: patent attempts to exploit the
Constitution for special protection, which, as Professor Ramseyer correctly
pointed out,17 is really no more than rent-seeking. The Supreme Court has
made clear that where there is a definite conflict between private interest and
10. See, e.g., Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishfi 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 4, 1973) (affg 1 Keisai Gepp6
544 (Utsunomiya Dist. Ct., May 29, 1969) and rev'g 619 HanreiJih6 93 (Tokyo H. Ct., May 12, 1970)).
11. Usaki, supra note 1.
12. See generally id. at Part 1IC.
13. 43 Minshu 385 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., June 20, 1989).
14. See Auer, Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force "Forever" to the
Third Largest Defense Budget in the World, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1990, at 171.
15. Shimizu v.Japan (The Fukuoka Bathhouse Case), 9 Keishfi 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,Jan. 1, 1955).
16. Umehara v. Japan, 29 Minshu 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975).
17. Ramseyer, Doctrines and Rents in Japan: A Comment on Professors Osuka and Nakamura, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1990, at 29.
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public welfare, the Constitution distinguishes between the two and gives
priority to public welfare.
There has been similar progress in the evolution of rulings on
malapportionment, so that the Supreme Court has now held unconstitutional
a 1 to 5 ratio between the least-represented voters and the most heavily
overrepresented voters in the lower house. A 1 to 3 ratio is apparently not
unconstitutional. A 1 to 4 ratio is difficult to call, and it is all right for the ratio
in the upper house to be worse.' 8 Despite this confusing delineation, it is still
encouraging that the Supreme Court has grappled with this issue and labelled
extreme malapportionment unconstitutional.
One of the interesting features of Supreme Court rulings on some of these
cases is that the Supreme Court will consider a district court or high court
ruling, one which is logically consistent and appears just and reasonable to
most constitutional experts, and alter it in the direction of inconsistency to
avoid causing political trouble. The Court's avoidance of politically sensitive
issues poses an interesting research question that Professors Itoh and Luney
have begun to address.' 9 It seems clear that the Supreme Court has indeed
been timid, or willing to live with great logical contradictions in its rulings. It
also appears that the Court has been developing rules of thumb to simplify
matters in tricky decisions, as in thejieitai and malapportionment cases.
It would be very interesting to determine why this is happening and what
the prospects for change are. One question to consider is whether the
Supreme Court operates this way because many of its justices are prewartrained and conservative of mind. If so, we could anticipate generational
changes as judges from lower courts and high courts move up the ranks and
as crucial new appointments to the Supreme Court are made. A different
possibility is that all appointees find themselves beset with similar pressures,
that is, similar fears about taking a forthright or politically controversial
position. If the political pressures on the Supreme Court are this great, then
we should not expect a new boldness in rulings even after considerable
generational change.
It would also be interesting to pursue Professor Itoh's line of empirical
research on individual votes by judges to draw out explanations of major
decisions and make projections about the future. Perhaps there are areas of
law where generational change is having great impact and other areas where it
is not. Perhaps generational change is visibly affecting district and high
courts, but political pressures at the Supreme Court make generational
change there less important.
Another possibility is to pursue Professor Luney's line of analysis by
looking at the political environment of the Supreme Court to make
predictions and comparisons with other countries concerning the fact that the
18. See Hata, supra note I at 160.
19. See ItohJudicialReview andJudicialActivism inJapan, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1990, at
169; Luney, The judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1990, at 135.
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Supreme Court is inside the Japanese executive branch rather than separate
from it. How are Supreme Court decisions affected by the Court's locus
inside the Ministry ofJustice and by the Court's composition through political
appointments?
It is also interesting to note the importance of carefully drawn definitions
in Supreme Court decisions. Professor Auer discusses the distinction
between defense and offense in rulings on Article 9. 2 0 In malapportionment
cases, the ratio of 1 to 4 has evolved as a sort of boundary between
unconstitutional malapportionment and acceptable malapportionment. In
political activity cases 2' and others, the courts have developed the politicalquestion doctrine to avoid trouble. Perhaps if more cases come up on
socioeconomic rights, the Supreme Court will begin to change its
interpretation of rights embodied in Articles 25 and 27 toward the
definition-a mechanical but substantive definition-of minimum standards
of wholesome and cultural living.
It would be very nice to see comparative studies of the Japanese
Constitution and court decisions. Presumably all courts have political
burdens and fears, and therefore rule on constitutional grounds only when all
other avenues fail; presumably all courts empowered with judicial review
resist using it. Further study could reveal the simplifying techniques that,
presumably, all courts, all decisionmakers, and all political bodies develop to
make their tasks a little easier and to deal with the political pressures upon
them.

20.
21.

Auer, supra note 14 at Part IVA-C.
E.g., Sakata v. Japan (the Sunakawa case), 13 Keish5i 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).

